Rethinking Injunctions by Wisdom, John Minor
Book Review
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The Civil Rights Injunction. By Owen M. Fiss. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1978. Pp. 117. $10.95.
Reviewed by John Minor Wisdomt
Professor Fiss has given us an important, succinct, thought-packed
critique of remedies.' The Civil Rights Injunction is a reappraisal
of the injunction in light of the civil rights experience. Its thesis, how-
ever, is not limited to civil rights cases; it extends to all types of injunc-
tions.
The author argues that courts have erred in making "irreparable
injury" a requirement for the issuance of an injunction,2 because they
talked about doctrine-sometimes obsolete doctrine-not about facts.
In his view, "the rules governing the choice of remedy-procedural
rules, if you will-cannot and should not be fashioned apart from and
independent of one's belief about the nature and justice of the under-
lying claim." 3 Consequently, Professor Fiss reclassifies injunctions
within a "context-specific evaluation of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of each form of relief."4 The traditional view of the hierarchy of
t Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
1. 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNcrioN (1978) [hereinafter cited by page number
only]. Professor Fiss is well qualified to write such a book. In addition to his casebook,
INJUNCTIONS (1972), he has written extensively and well on areas in which the injunction
has played an increasingly important role. See, e.g., Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Dombrowski]; Fiss, Gaston County v. United States: Fruition of
the Freezing Principle, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 379. For his most recent exposition on the
remedial process, see Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979).
2. The accepted view is that equity developed preventive remedies to protect property
rights, on the theory of quia timit, to enjoin injuries threatening irreparable damage.
2 J. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE ch. 21 (13th ed. 1886). The "principal object of
attack" in Professor Fiss's book is the irreparable injury requirement, which "received a
new lease on life in Douglas v. City of Jeanifette," 319 U.S. 157 (1943), "and was
reinvigorated with a vengeance by a line of cases that begins in 1971 with Younger v.
Harris," 401 U.S. 37 (1971). P. 42.
3. P. 91.
4. P. 6.
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remedies assumed that noninjunctive remedies would be efficacious
and that an injunction was a subordinate, last-resort remedy to prevent
irreparable injury. That view, Professor Fiss demonstrates, should give
way.
This reevaluation of the injunction is long overdue. Felix Frank-
furter and Nathan Greene made the last important critical study of the
subject in 1930, writing The Labor Injunction,5 which was almost a
brief for the Norris-LaGuardia Act. That work was a study of the
abuses of the injunction as a tool of industrial warfare0 and cannot be
regarded as a general argument for narrowing the use of all injunc-
tions. Since that time, we have been through the civil rights experience,
in which we recognized pervasive ills in our social structure and
developed injunctive remedies to correct them. Professor Fiss is con-
cerned that in a period of "reconstitution," injunctive relief may be-
come hostage to the verbal rigidity of ancient doctrine. I share his
concerns. It would be a mordant irony if equitable procedures should
become so calcified by arthritic doctrine as to defeat the doing of equity.
Professor Fiss begins by redrawing the map traditionally used to
locate the types of injunctions. The coordinates on the old map were
procedural: there were interlocutory orders and final orders. Orders
were sometimes also captioned by the style of their coerciveness as
mandatory or prohibitory. This procedural approach was unrelated to
the wrong under scrutiny and was not descriptive of the remedy. Thus
it was unilluminating in trying to distinguish, for example, restraints of
speech from voting rights cases or from school desegregation cases.
Professor Fiss adds coordinates that have reference to the wrong, and
to the remedial end an injunctive order is intended to serve. He in-
troduces three new categories: the preventive injunction, which seeks
to prohibit some discrete act or series of acts from occurring in the
future; the reparative injunction, which compels the defendant to
engage in a course of action that seeks to correct the effects of a past
5. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930). For useful accounts of
the history and operation of the injunction, see 0. FIss, INJUNCTIONs (1972) and Develop-
ments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REv. 994 (1965).
6. The most significant use of the injunction in a labor context culminated in the
celebrated case of In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). The American Railway Union, led by
Eugene Debs, struck in favor of the Pullman workers and tied up the railways of the
nation until an injunction broke the strike. The injunction was based on removing the
obstruction to interstate commerce. Id. at 598-600.
Interestingly, courts in the Fifth Circuit have relied on Debs as a civil rights tool,
using that case as authority for an antiobstruction injunction when the defendant's acts
could be characterized as a burden on interstate commerce. United States v. City of
Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, 14 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Original Knights of Ku Klux Klan,
250 F. Supp. 330, 356 (E.D. La. 1965).
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wrong; and the structural injunction, which seeks to reorganize an
ongoing social institution. Preventive injunctions are forward looking
and often, though not necessarily, are directed to the particular in-
dividual or the office commanding or forbidding a certain act. The
reparative and structural injunctions are of more recent birth and are
not just preventive as to future acts. They are curative, and hence
backward looking.7
As courts faced the difficult task of achieving desegregation during
the 1950s and 1960s, it became increasingly clear that preventive and
reparative injunctions could not fully achieve the needed compliance.
Preventive injunctions affected too few parties and were easily dis-
obeyed. The reparative injunction, although it cut more deeply than
the preventive injunction into social institutions, was not powerful
enough to remove segregation from schools in the South. For this, the
structural injunction was required.8 The constitutional wrong was the
institution itself, and it was the institution that had to be changed for
civil rights to be safeguarded. The lesson was clear: the injunction was
no longer exclusively preventive, and irreparable injury to an in-
dividual plaintiff was relegated to the background. 9
In his discussion, Professor Fiss does not merely champion the
structural injunction, but questions the justifications for the remedial
hierarchy. He examines the correctness of the concept of a hierarchy
of remedies in which the injunction occupies a subordinate position.
In addressing these normative concerns, he analyzes the arguments that
could be used to defend the hierarchy. One of these arguments is par-
7. Professor Fiss makes the distinctions quite clear:
The preventive injunction might be viewed as a mini-criminal statute, though more
individuated, more decentralized, and with greater power invested in the judge.
With the newer categories, those with roots in civil rights litigation, we seem to move
in two different directions. The reparative injunction closely resembles the damage
judgment and might be viewed as an in-kind damage award, while the structural
injunction emerges ... as a truly unique legal instrument.
P. 8.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.
1966), afl'd, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967) (case in
which the court issued detailed instructions to school officials to achieve desegregation).
See generally F. READ 8 L. McGOUGH, LET THEir BE JUDGED (1978) (discussing judicial
integration in deep South).
9. Professor Fiss explains:
A structural decree-one of the most distinctive legacies of the civil rights experi-
ence-should not be viewed as an instrument seeking to prevent a future wrong
through deterrence. Rather, it should be viewed as a means of initiating a relation-
ship between a court and a social institution. The issuance of the injunction is not
so much a coercive act, such as issuing a command, as it is a declaration that hence-
forth the court will direct or manage the reconstruction of the social institution, in
order to bring it into conformity with the Constitution.
Pp. 36-37 (footnote omitted).
827
The Yale Law Journal
ticularly important: how do we know that a federal judge sitting in an
injunctive proceeding is better able to afford relief for a given wrong
than an administrative agency, a jury, a legislature, or a state court?
In examining the issue of institutional competence, Professor Fiss
might have developed more fully a response to the contention that ad-
ministrative agencies are to be preferred to courts in providing certain
kinds of relief. I agree with the author, however, that it is naive to
believe that special expertise reposes in administrative agencies to such
an extent that it cannot be transferred to courts.' In any event, argu-
ments against the injunction based on claims of institutional com-
petence can easily be dismissed, with one exception: the preference for
state courts over federal courts.
This preference involves a highly controversial choice of values in
American political theory. Proponents of state court remedies have
seized upon the irreparable injury requirement for injunctions as an
argument for courts to resort to a late nineteenth century concept of
federalism, a concept termed "Our Federalism" by Justice Black in
Younger v. Harris."
Professor Fiss fixes the starting point for this atavistic concept as that
"extraordinary day in 1943 when the Supreme Court decided both
Murdock v. Pennsylvania and Douglas v. City of Jeannette."'2 Both
cases considered an ordinance of the City of Jeannette prohibiting
solicitation without a license. In Murdock, the Court held the or-
dinance unconstitutional as applied to activities of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses. 13 Douglas easily could have rested on Murdock, but the Court
held that in the absence of a showing of irreparable injury, a federal
court had no jurisdiction to enjoin a state criminal proceeding.14 Pro-
fessor Fiss analyzed Douglas as having two prongs: the first was to
assert that the injunctive suit threatened federalism, and the second
was to use the irreparable injury requirement to eliminate that threat.,;
10. Courts implementing structural reforms have appointed commissions, special
masters, and monitors to supervise compliance by schools and prisons. See, e.g., Palmigiano
v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 989 (D.R.I. 1977); Taylor v. Perini, 413 F. Supp. 189, 193
(N.D. Ohio 1976).
11. 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (federal courts will not enjoin pending state criminal
prosecution except under extraordinary circumstances in which danger of irreparable
loss is both great and immediate). In Younger, the plaintiff, indicted for violating a
state act, sued in federal district court to enjoin the prosecution, contending that prosecu-
tion was unconstitutional.
12. P. 62; see Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Douglas v. City of Jean-
nette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
13. 319 U.S. at 108.
14. 319 U.S. at 163-64.
15. P. 63.
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"The result was to create, in our remedial hierarchy, a preference for
the state criminal defense-you must use it if you can." 16 I stand with
Professor Fiss: the Douglas theory of federalism is unsound.17 It exag-
gerates state interests and downgrades federal interests. If the basic
philosophy of Douglas and Younger had prevailed during the 1960s, I
am convinced that the progress toward judicial recognition of civil
rights and civil liberties would have slowed to a walk. With deference,
I suggest that Douglas, Younger, and their progeny are not good law,
not good history, and not good federalism.
Intermediate judges must be good soldiers on the bench. But the
soldiering would be easier if the doctrinal ramifications of Douglas and
Younger were restricted to preventive injunctive proceedings in which
the state is a party or in which enforcement is sought through the
contempt power., One may concede, for purposes of argument, that the
role federalism ascribes to federal courts in Younger is a valid one.
One could say the role is a response to the traditional question in the
preventive injunction context: Is there no adequate alternative means
of relief? The answer has reference to state process; state process may
be adequate and must be tried.
It makes little sense, however, to ask this question in the structural
setting. At least initially, cases involving use of the structural injunc-
tion centered on elimination of de jure segregation in the schools or
reform of a prison system. In this context, an institution that could
readily be delineated was by design infringing federally protected
rights. Once it was agreed that the conditions violated the Constitu-
tion, there was no question but that the offending institutions had to
be redesigned. The courts did not ask whether there was an alternative
remedy. The wrong was unlike those alleged in the familiar single-
plaintiff, single-defendant model, the model in Douglas and later in
Younger. For individual wrongs, both state and federal processes have
remedies although one might argue about differences in effectiveness.
But for structural wrongs in which the operation of the institution as
such will lead to violation of the Constitution, there was no remedy
until development of the structural injunction.
The early structural injunction cases were easy. Their analytic sim-
plicity, captured in the de jure/de facto distinction, derives from the
16. Id.
17. Professor Fiss writes: "It is hard to believe that the state interest being vindicated
... is in any sense vital . . . .Moreover, given the nature of the claim-that a state is
violating the federal Constitution-it is hard to see how the Douglas rule could serve the
usual values of localism." Id.
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clarity with which the institution and its activities are defined. Rem-
edies may be administratively unwieldy or politically unpopular, but
they are analytically easy to determine.
The success of the structural injunction prompted requests for its
application in other contexts, exemplified by the Philadelphia police
case of Rizzo v. Goode.18 In Rizzo, the analytically clear connection
between the institution, the wrong, and the remedy that was present in
the school desegregation cases did not exist. It was not even clear what
the institution in question was; it might have been the policeman only,
or the policeman plus police chief, or police department plus the
mayor, or some other configuration of parties. I am not saying that
the institution is impossible to define for remedial purposes, but I
am saying that it does not define itself as did the institutions in need
of reform in the de jure school cases.
Faced with this complex demand for relief, the Supreme Court, with
all good will, relied upon what was a superficially analogous situation.
It noted that the state was somehow involved in Rizzo and turned to
the doctrine developed in Younger to mediate between the state and
an individual seeking federal relief.19 But the situations are not truly
analogous. In a Younger situation remedies should be available in both
state and federal systems, and the question is which court system should
administer the remedy. Built into the Younger situation are the twin
presuppositions that we know who the actors are and we know what
the appropriate remedy should look like. The Rizzo situation is dif-
ferent; we do not know when we begin the analysis who the parties
are nor what the relief should look like.
In such a situation, one cannot afford to rely on doctrinaire fed-
eralism to determine which system should dispense the remedy. To do
so means that one never asks the fundamental question: Is there an
institution whose operation will necessarily violate rights so that relief
is appropriate? That is not to say that reliance on such discourse does
not resolve the matter. It does: relief is denied. But it is denied without
being considered, adenial that cannot be justified in a system demand-
ing articulate reasons in support of results.
The essential contribution of Professor Fiss's critique is that it re-
18. 423 U.S. 362, 378-80 (1976) (denying request for injunctive relief that would impose
prophylactic procedures to minimize alleged police misconduct, holding in part that such
action would constitute an unwarranted federal judicial intrusion into discretionary af-
fairs of state). Rizzo was a class-action suit against the mayor of Philadelphia, the police
commissioner, and others, alleging a pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional police
mistreatment of minority citizens in particular and Philadelphia citizens in general.
19. Id. at 380. Strangely, the Court did not cite Younger.
830
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veals the difficulty that courts confronted in the later structural in-
junction cases. Looking for doctrinal guidance, courts relied on doctrine
that ensured by its terms that the essential questions would not be
aired. The contribution of this critique cannot be overestimated. We
may disagree about whether a remedy should issue in cases analogous
to Rizzo, but the argument must be one that can air the issues, not
displace them.
We are indebted to Professor Fiss for showing us that in a Rizzo
situation we must ask first whether a remedy is appropriate, not which
court system should administer a hypothetical remedy. This insight
does not provide the answers in the structural context although it does
direct us to the proper questions. I should like to offer some tentative
thoughts on how the context-specificity thesis requires us to argue in
Rizzo-like cases.
The central question is whether relief is appropriate at all. A sub-
question is whether a court is warranted in exercising its power by
imposing a structural remedy in the case. To phrase the question dif-
ferently: Can the court find an institutional defendant over which to
assert its power? What makes this question so difficult to answer is the
complexity of the concept of an institution. As I suggested, the early
structural decrees involved the limiting case: institutions that were
self-evident in their limits and self-proclaimed as regards their uncon-
stitutional policies. Until we have a clear notion of the institution
under attack in a case, the court's power has no base. We need, then,
to talk about institutions, to determine in the context of a given case
whether we can point, as it were, to a machine for the invasion of
rights. I would suggest that if we can answer this question by pointing
to an institution, the next questions-whether it violates rights, and
what remedy is appropriate-are comparatively easy.
This examination may be going on in some courts already, simul-
taneously with the Babel of Federalism. Consider, for instance, how
recent civil rights cases have turned on the evidence. In certain cases
relief has been contingent on evidence of purposeful discrimination,
20
20. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979) (facially neutral employ-
ment classification affecting sexes unequally does not violate equal protection absent
legislative intent to discriminate on basis of gender); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976) (race discrimination in employment case; proof of discriminatory intent required
to find violation of equal protection clause).
There is inherent ambiguity in the requirement of "purposeful discrimination." Every-
one in the city of Jackson, Mississippi, knew that the reason for the closing of its swim-
ming pools was to circumvent a desegregation order. But Justice Black, for a majority of
the Court, held that the possibility of illicit motivation (purposeful discrimination) by
the sponsors of a legislative act was no ground for holding the act unconstitutional.
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in others on a showing of a pattern or practice of discrimination,2' and
in still others on a showing of discriminatory impact.22 While these
evidentiary requirements are responsive to the need to define an in-
stitution prior to deciding whether it should be restructured, they are
an incomplete solution to the problem of demonstrating the presence
of an institution. They may be inflexible and may defeat the demon-
stration rather than aid it. They do focus on facts, however, and on
how a putative institution operates. This is the correct approach. If we
can rid ourselves of doctrinaire federalism and get down to matters of
fact when confronted with a prayer for relief such as that in Rizzo, we
will have a chance of answering the proper question. I see little chance
of this happening if the axiom for the structural injunction, to use
Professor Fiss's dramatic but exact phrase, remains "Younger and not
Brown."2
3
Commenting on Rizzo elsewhere, Professor Fiss remarked that
"[f]ederalism is but one handle available to the [Burger] Court for
curbing some of the more ambitious-more idealistic-projects of its
own judges."24 Such projects include supervision of municipal police
forces, supervision of state prisons, mental health programs, and de-
segregation of schools and state universities. By firmly affixing the
structural injunction in the traditional hierarchy, with irreparable in-
jury as a requirement, we come perilously close to ensuring that viola-
tions of basic rights by state governments will be immune from remedy.
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). The Court accepted the district court's finding
that the pools were dosed because it was uneconomical to maintain integrated pools. Id.
at 219.
It is not clear to me where the requirement of segregative intent set forth in Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), will lead us. It might have been useful in Palmer v.
Thompson. But it may narrow the enforcement of rights in de facto segregation cases
such as those involving Chicanos. We must see to what degree intent relates to foreseeable
consequences and to a disproportionate impact coupled with other factors. See Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977) (setting
forth disproportionate impact standard). See generally Fiss, Remarks at the Second Circuit
Judicial Conference, 74 F.R.D. 276-81 (1976) (discussing intent standards); Note, Reading
the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto[De Jure Distinction,
86 YALE L.J. 317, 321-32 (1976) (same).
21. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) ("pattern
or practice" of teacher employment discrimination); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (government sustained burden of proving that company
engaged in system-wide pattern or practice of employment discrimination against minority
members).
22. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971, 2978-80 (1979) (implying
use of effects test where Brown imposed affirmative duty on school boards whose districts
were segregated in 1954 to disestablish school system); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick,
99 S. Ct. 2941, 2950 (1979) (same).
23. Dombrowski, supra note 1, at 1159.
24. Id. at 1160.
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Federal courts should examine the rights and remedies in a factual
context and not rely on the language of "Our Federalism" and the
etiquette of comity when violations of basic rights are charged.
The friction that once existed between state judges and federal
judges has diminished to almost zero. Moreover, most states now have
strong courts of last resort as competent and as willing to decide con-
stitutional questions as are federal courts. Nevertheless, any federal
judge who was exposed to the civil rights experience knows that in
some states many times in the past the only effective forum for vindica-
tion of constitutional rights was the federal forum. And certainly his-
torical federalism, Madison-federalism, makes it more appropriate for
federal courts than for state courts to protect nationally created or
nationally guaranteed rights. As I wrote fifteen years ago in dissent in
the three-judge court opinion in Dombrowski v. Pfister:25
When the wrongful invasion comes from the state, and espe-
cially when the unlawful state action is locally popular or when
there is local disapproval of the requirements of federal law,
federal courts must expect to bear the primary responsibility for
protecting the individual. This responsibility is not new. It did
not start with the School Segregation Cases. It is close to the
heart of the American Federal Union. It is implicit in the replace-
ment of the Articles of Confederation by the Constitution. It
makes federalism workable.
26
Professor Fiss's approach moves us toward an adequate judicial
examination of rights and appropriate remedies. Characteristically, he
does not raise a new hierarchy where he razed the old. His call for a
context-specific evaluation of available remedies is not a call to exalt
the injunction but to recognize the tough pragmatic nature of remedial
orders. It is an assertion of the commonsense proposition that when a
federal injunction is the most effective remedy, it should be used with-
out necessarily requiring a showing that it is the last alternative to
avoid irreparable injury. By putting aside the language of hierarchies
and the grammar of atavistic federalism, not only can we get to the
substance of rights, but we can develop a workable, substantive theory
of remedies. Perhaps there is nothing more difficult. At least, discus-
sion should be started in the terms Professor Fiss has supplied.
25. 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964) (three-judge court), rev'd, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
26. Id. at 570-71 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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